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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The tax statute is content based, and is constitutionally overbroad in that it 
taxes theatrical productioins based on even brief, non-sexual nudity, condemning the 
theatre company as "sexually explicit" on the basis of even a single production. 
The tax is not a regulation aimed at secondary effects, but is censorship aimed 
at primary effects, the effect that viewing a production may possibly have on its 
audience. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
l 
THE TAX IMPOSED BY THIS STATUTE IS CONTENT BASED, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD, AND VIOLATES THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. 
Defendants deny that the tax at issue is content based, and contend that it 
uniformly applies to commercial transactions on a content neutral basis. (Br. p. 13-
14). Defendants there reply to Plaintiffs' citation to the recent case of Pooh-Bah 
Enterprises. Inc. v. County of Cook. N.E. , 2007 WL 4526527 (111. App. Dec. 
21,2007). The tax in that case specifically discriminated against adult entertainment. 
According to Defendants because the instant tax does affect "legitimate theatre" as 
well as adult entertainment, cannot be "content based". That is nonsense. Both taxes 
are content based, although in different ways. The Chicago tax singles out certain 
adult entertainment and exempts "legitimate theatre". It must be assumed that the 
framers of the tax at issue here had that result. There cannot be much doubt that the 
instant tax was not meant to target legitimate theatre, just by its title" "Sexually 
explicit business". But it is still a content based tax. This tax is content-based 
precisely because it does apply to commercial transactions on the basis of content -
and that content is the presence of nudity in a commercial entertainment production. 
This is the basis for its overbreadth and its constitutional invalidity. On the same 
day that Plaintiffs counsel received Defendants' brief, he also received a flyer from 
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the Salt Lake Acting Company (SL AC), which has been reproduced in the Addendum 
hereto. From January 30 through February 24, 2008, SLAC, a professional theatre 
company known mostly for its irreverent annual production of "Saturday's Voyeur" 
a running spoof on Utah culture, will present a play entitled "Skin in Flames" by 
Spanish playwright Guillem Clua. The flyer quotes KDHX Radio in St. Louis as 
saying: 
For more adventurous theatergoers, for any who oppose the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq or who question the morality of U.S. foreign policy, and 
for those who need their complacency challenged, this piece is essential 
viewing." 
At the bottom of the flyer is the warning: "Contains nudity and strong sexual content. 
Recommended for mature audiences." Fortunately for SLAC, the play, which has 
been produced in a number of American cities, runs only 25 days. Or perhaps it is by 
design, as it closes just a few days before the nudity referred to in its advertising 
would turn this venerable performing arts organization into a "sexually explicit 
business". Once again, according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102 (4), the definition 
of a business subject to this "content neutral tax" is: 
"Sexually explicit business" means a business at which any nude or partially 
denuded individual, regardless of whether the nude of partially denuded 
individual is an employee of the sexually explicit business or an independent 
contractor, performs any service: 
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(a) personally on the premises of the sexually explicit business; 
(b) during at least 30 consecutive or non-consecutive days within a 
calendar year: and 
(c) for: 
(i) a salary; 
(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; 
(v)profit; or 
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in Subsection (4)(c). 
It is unfortunate for SLAC, however, that this particular production is at the beginning 
of the year. Care must be taken not to produce any other play which may appeal to the 
"adventurous theatergoer" during this calendar year. And, of course, the production 
must not be so successful that it will be held over for an additional week. One can 
assume that the Tax Commission will be watching carefully and counting the days, 
anticipating the increase in State revenue, and the chance to apply its "content 
neutral" statute to this arts organization. What a burden on the Salt Lake arts 
community! Maybe the legislature didn't mean for this to happen; but the likelihood 
that it would, has been obvious from the start. The tax is a content based burden on 
free speech. 
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Of course, it was intended to drag into the web such venues as the Salt Lake 
Acting Company. The tax, however, is no less content based because it inadvertently 
did so. The trigger (nudity) is very clearly content based. If a theatrical production 
uses nudity, the time clock starts clicking. It matters not whether that nudity is a 
legitimate and important part of the production, or that it has little or nothing to do 
with being "sexually explicit". It is disingenuous to suggest that the nudity need not 
be in conjunction with expression, as the tax is clearly aimed right at that expression. 
And because it is not aimed at secondary effects (which Defendants refer to with little 
knowledge of the legal doctrine), that doctrine cannot save it. The simple fact is that 
the same theatrical production without nudity does not cause its producer to risk being 
taxed, and thus it has a "chilling effect" in forcing the theatrical producer to either 
modify its content, or to carefully restrict its production to less than 30 days in a year. 
This problem is not in any sense theoretical, as the current Salt Lake City theatrical 
production so vividly attests. 
Defendants also fail to respond in any way to the citation of authority that a tax 
which bears no relation to the cost of regulating First Amendment business entities 
cannot be constitutionally justified. No mention is made by Defendants of any of the 
authority cited by Plaintiffs that First Amendment rights may not be taxed. See 
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Arkansas WritersT Project. Inc. v. Ragland. 481 U.S. 221 (1987), Minneapolis Star v. 
Minnesota Comm'r of Rev..460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983), City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books. Inc.. 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002), Acorn Investments. Inc. v. City of 
Seattle. 887 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989), Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd.. 502 
U.S. 105 (1991) and TK's Video. Inc. v. Denton County. 24 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 
1994). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co.. Inc.. 297 U.S. 233 (1936) which 
contains a fine historical review of the efforts of the British government to use taxes 
as a means of censoring the press, as a cause of the American Revolution: 
In 1712, in response to a message from Queen Anne (Hansard's Parliamentary 
History of England, vol. 6, p. 1063). Parliament imposed a tax upon all 
newspapers and upon advertisements. Collett, vol. 1, pp. 8-10. That the main 
purpose of these taxes was to suppress the publication of comments and 
criticisms objectionable to the Crown does not admit of doubt. "Stewart, 
Lennox and the Taxes on Knowledge", 15 Scottish Heritage Review. 322-327. 
There followed more than a century of resistance to, and evasion of, the taxes, 
and of agitation for their repeal. In the article last referred to (p. 326), which 
was written in 1918, it was pointed out that these taxes constituted one of the 
factors that aroused the American colonists to protest against taxation for the 
purposes of the home government, and that the revolution really began when, 
in 1765, that government sent stamps for newspaper duties to the American 
colonies. Id. at 246. 
And further, see the very recent case of 729 Inc. v. Kenton County Fiscal Court. 
F.3d , (6th Cir., February 6, 2008) also holding that a licensing fee imposed on an 
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adult entertainment business must be reasonably related to the cost of regulating the 
business. There seems to be no explanation for the failure to address this important 
point, other than a concession that there is no answer. 
The instant case is reminiscent of that in Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah 1989). There, the City of Provo prohibited discussion of sexual activity, in 
a public place. As this Court observed there: 
As Willden points out, the ordinance quite plainly prohibits a husband or wife 
from discretely suggesting to his or her spouse in whispers while strolling in a 
public park, that they later engage in sexual intercourse in the privacy of their 
own home. In addition, the solicitation of a wider variety of other activities the 
Ordinance describes as "sexual conduct" is also prohibited. That definition 
includes, inter alia, "any touching of the covered or uncovered genitals, human 
female breast, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female... between 
members of the . . . opposite sex . . . in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification." To our knowledge, this state has no statutes that purport to make 
the wide variety of conduct described by quoted language illegal between 
married couples, or for that matter, between unmarried couples, when carried 
out in private. It follows that a flat ban on the public solicitation of all such 
private activity is a content-based speech regulation that runs afoul of the first 
amendment. 
Both instances are obvious examples of "content-based speech regulations"; and both 
very clearly "run afoul of the first amendment." The attempt by Defendants to miscast 
this statute as aimed at secondary affects does not change its nature to one of societal 
benevolence. 
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POINT II 
THIS TAX IS NOT A REGULATION DESIGNED TO AMELIORATE 
SECONDARY EFFECTS. 
Defendants, on page 10 of their brief, repeat some of the baseless claims made, 
without foundation, by Kathy Ockey, at the Utah House legislative committee 
hearing, that "a significant portion of sex offenders, do utilize these types of 
businesses, over 50%". In the next paragraph, Defendants make the same 
unsupported "leap of faith" made by the trial Court, linking this statement with 
"secondary effects": 
Moreover, while plaintiffs may disagree with the legislature's reliance on the 
testimony linking use of the taxed services with secondary effects, they 
presented no testimony to the district court countering this testimony. 
(Emphasis added). 
While the testimony of Ms. Ockey did mention "an analysis by Hanson and Busia" 
[properly "Hanson and Bussiere"], she did not name the report or produce copies. It 
was up to counsel for Plaintiffs to dig it out of the literature, and show that it was 
irrelevant to the issues before the legislature. When Federal courts have ruled that 
regulation of adult businesses were validly based on "reasonable belief that the 
remedy chosen would ameliorate secondary effects, they have required some 
knowledge on the part of the legislators, as to the nature of the material relied upon. 
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See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) and City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books. Inc.. 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002). In Doctor John's. Inc. v. City of 
Sioux City. Iowa. 305 F.Supp.2d 1022, 1031 (N.D.Iowa 2004) the Federal Court 
enjoined the enforcement of an adult entertainment ordinance. Unlike many such 
ordinances, there was no "preamble" referring to the various studies and cases 
concerning the existence and threat of secondary effects. Testimony by the City 
Planner was that he was aware of such studies, but that was not enough: 
There is no evidence in the record, however, that Mr. Nelson conveyed his 
understanding or summaries of the studies he examined to members of the City 
Counsel of the City of Sioux City or to the City Attorney or conveyed the 
studies themselves to City Counsel members of the City Attorney. Surprisingly, 
the studies themselves were never offered or admitted into evidence in the 
preliminary injunction proceedings. Although the parties do not appear to 
dispute that the subsequent amendments to the City of Sioux City's ordinances 
were drafted by the City Attorney, there is no evidence that the City Attorney 
or the City Council members independently reviewed any similar studies or 
other evidence of the "secondary effects" of adult entertainment businesses at 
any time prior to amending Sioux City's zoning ordinances. 
The Tenth Circuit recently invalidated a zoning Ordinance which did not appear 
reasonably related to the evidence of secondary effects upon which it relied. The 
Court served notice that a simple reference to "secondary effects" as a defense to a 
challenge will not be sufficient. In Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Board of 
Commissioners of Dickinson County. Kansas. 492 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2007) the 
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Court said: 
In the case at bar, the studies relied upon include a wide variety of 
methodologies, both anecdotal and empirical, and are not easily summarized. 
Equally diverse are the studies' findings. Although most, if not all, find that 
adult businesses trigger at least some secondary effects in surrounding areas, the 
findings rest on a number of factors, including: the type of neighborhood in 
which the sexually oriented businesses are located, the concentration of 
sexually oriented businesses, and the nature of the sexually oriented business 
itself. All of the studies relied upon by the Board examine the secondary effects 
of sexually oriented businesses located in urban environments; none examine 
businesses situated in an entirely rural area. To hold that legislators may 
reasonably rely on theses studies to regulate a single adult bookstore, located 
on a highway pullout far from any business or residential area within the 
County, would be to abdicate our "independent judgment" entirely. Such a 
holding would require complete deference to a local government's reliance on 
prepackaged secondary effects studies from other jurisdictions to regulate any 
sexually oriented business, of any type, located in any setting. 492 F.3d at 
1174-1175. 
Had the Alameda Books plurality and Justice Kennedy held that any 
municipality may reasonably rely on the existing body of prepackaged 
secondary effects studies to justify a zoning ordnance regulating local sexually 
oriented businesses, we would affirm the district court on this point. They did 
not, but instead reaffirmed municipalities' need to make a showing that the 
evidence on which they relied is germane to their local experience. We are 
therefore constrained to hold that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to 
whether the evidence cited by the Board provides a sufficient connection 
between the continued operation of Dickinson County sexually oriented 
businesses and the negative secondary effects targeted by the Second 
Ordinance. Id at 1178. 
In striking the County ordinance, the Court referred explicitly to the location and 
distance factors that come into play in secondary effects analysis. The Court ruled that 
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studies of urban areas, and the secondary effects that may occur around adult 
businesses there, are not necessarily relevant to rural areas. And that is a fatal flaw in 
the instant statute. It does not address the effects that may occur in specific 
surrounding areas, but to social phenomena that may occur anywhere and at any time. 
These phenomena cannot be linked to the presence of an adult business in a specific 
place; and so they cannot be included in secondary effects analyses. 
Aside from the fact that the testimony of Ms. Ockey was inadmissable hearsay, 
it was completely contrary to acceptable authority on this subject. The legislature 
cannot have relied on the studies themselves, because they never even knew what 
studies they were. Defendants did not bother to respond to Plaintiffs' citations to 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMIV Text Revision) which 
firmly show that Ms. Ockey was completely off base. But that is not the most 
important of glaring mistake made here by Defendants. Defendants still fail to 
understand that the possible "access" of such entertainment by sex offenders does not 
constitute secondary effects. In their main brief, Plaintiffs cited substantial authority 
from the United State Supreme Court that such allegations do not involve secondary 
effects. Plaintiffs cited Boos v. Barrv. 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988), Ashcroft vs. Free 
Speech Coalition. 535 U.S. 234,253-254,152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002), Reno v. American 
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Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) and the Second Circuit case of U.S. Sound 
and Service, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 126 F.3d 555 (3rd Cir. 1997), all of which 
clearly and unequivocally so hold. No reference to any of these cases is made in 
Defendants' Brief. Either Defendants do not understand the effect of these decisions 
on their case, or hope that this Court does not understand it. Once again, Defendants' 
failure to so respond seems to be a concession that they have no answer. Neither do 
they have any answer to the statement by the legislature's own counsel that this kind 
of law must survive strict scrutiny. Having ignored the law that "Regulations that 
focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience present a different situation" 
(Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)), Defendants, make no effort to even 
respond to the strict scrutiny arguments. Defendants' secondary effects arguments are 
without merit; and their failure to even deal with this area of the law seems a 
concession of invalidity. 
Defendants cite in a footnote only to an unpublished Sixth Circuit case, 
Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed. App. 438 (6th Cir. 2002) which cites secondary 
effects as the reason for upholding the licensing of an escort agency: 
The ordinance is within the City's governmental power because the protection 
of health and safety are withing a government's police powers. Important 
governmental interests are at stake, namely: controlling adverse secondary 
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effects related to public nudity such as prostitution, obscenity, transmission of 
disease, and danger to minors. (Internal citations omitted). IdL at 446-447. 
Thus there is authority for dealing with secondary effects by licensing, even when the 
business activity is not confined to a permanent place. The secondary effects claimed, 
however, are still limited in time and space to the area where the performance takes 
place. All the Plaintiffs here are licensed and regulated by the municipality in which 
they are located. And, once again, courts have held on several occasions in cases cited 
herein by Plaintiffs, that licensing fees can be assessed, provided that they are related 
to the cost of regulation. But this is not what this statute purports to do. Defendants 
cite this case without dealing with a main point of the decision: 
The ordinance also is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The 
ordinance aims to regulate the secondary effects of the expression, not the 
expression itself or its primary effects such as "the effect on the audience of 
watching nude erotic dancing," Id. at 447. (Emphasis added.) 
Perhaps Defendants now would like to rethink their defense of the tax statute as a 
reaction to the propensity of some customers to have sexual adjustment problems. 
But, from the beginning, this statute has been aimed at primary effects, which is 
exactly what courts have prohibited over and over again. Once again, the debate on 
the House floor is instructive: 
Rep. Ure: [against] I do personally believe that we're overstepping into the First 
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Amendment rights. I believe that this will come back to haunt us on this and 
that it will cost us some money, and I am not saying we shouldn't go all the way 
for it. But I think we have stepped over the bounds of the First Amendment 
rights and it's kind of hard for me to stand up and argue on this because of my 
background of not appreciating that. I'm not going to be supporting this bill. 
I believe it crosses the limit and I believe that we are just not going to be able 
to hold it up in any kind of lawsuit. (R. 118-119). 
Rep. Buffmire: [in favor] It seems to me that we are being very inconsistent. 
We're talking about women and children, for the most part, and some boys, that 
are going to be attacked and are attacked in our society in a very criminal and 
life shaping occurrence. We have passed out how many bills that we have 
debated, that we know are unconstitutional, we know that we're going to go 
into lawsuits. In this case we have a State that had this rule that has not been 
changed by a Supreme Court case. Yes, it might be, but it's not a sure thing. 
But we passed out the others that we know are a sure thing. Let's be a little bit 
consistent and let's think of what we're doing. (R. 120-121). 
It has been said that the legislative body that passes a law makes its own conclusion 
as to the constitutionality of that law. Here, however, we have a concrete example of 
concerns expressed over constitutionality, by both the legislature's counsel, and a 
member during floor debate. The response is that unconstitutional legislation is 
passed regularly; and it should not be a factor on this particular occasion. The 
legislature has thus defaulted on its constitutional responsibility, leaving this Court to 
make that judgment unaided. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to determine that there are no material facts in dispute 
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and that the tax levied against these businesses by Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah 
Code is an unlawful prior restraint and a violation of Plaintiffs rights to free 
expression under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory 
Judgment in their favor. 
DATED this _//_ day of February, 2008. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
L^/> 
W. Andrei McCullough / ni" u jo 
Attorney for Plaintiffs t»*> fW/^U 
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Addendum 
(two pages) 
Salt Lake Acting Company 
Presents 
(La Pell en Flames) 
by Guillem Clua and translation by DJ Sanders 
"...for more adventurous theatergoers, for any who oppose the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq or who question the morality of U.S. foreign 
policy, and for those who need their complacency challenged, this 
piece is essential viewing." KDHX Radio, st Louis 
Contains nudity and strong sexual content. 
Recommended for mature audiences. Jan 30 - Feb 24 
Tickets 363-7522/www.saltlakeactingcompany.org 
168 West 500 North, SLC 
Skin 
in 
Flames 
By Guillem Clua 
translation by DJ Sanders 
Jan. 30-Feb. 24 
Directed by Guest Director 
Roger Benington 
with Paul Kiernan, Morgan Lund, 
Deena Marie Manzanares, Kenya Rene 
Stay Engaged 
We invite you to join with us and community scholars and guests to talk about 
the uniquely relevant issues explored in Skin in Flames. 
Skin in Flames takes a timely look at the false promise of Western-style 
democracy in places where it can't have any meaning. It offers a different 
perspective on the relationship between the First World and the Third World in the 
context of war. And it challenges us, in a thoughtfully disturbing way, to question 
the politics of cultural memory. 
Don't miss these opportunities to Engage, Connect and Belong! 
Wednesday Jan. 6 A short Pre-Show talk about Skin in Flames 
and the award-winning Catalan playwright Guillem Clua. 7:00pm 
(performance follows at 7:30pm). 
Sunday Feb. 3 Matinee Post Play Discussion with dramaturg 
Mike Dorrell, guest director Roger Benington and panel guest (follows the 
2:00pm performance). 
Saturday Feb. 23 Matinee Post Play Discussion with 
panel guests (follows the 2:00pm performance). 
TICKETS AND INFORMATION CALL 3 6 3 - 7 5 2 2 www.saltlakeactingcompany.org 
SALT LAKE ACTING COMPANY 
168 West 500 North 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
www.saltlakeactingcompany.org 
Non-Profit org 
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